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COMMENTS
DO STATE WATER ANTI-EXPORTATION STATUTES
VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE? or
WILL NEW MEXICO'S EMBARGO LAW
HOLD WATER?
INTRODUCTION
In September 1980, the city of El Paso, Texas, filed suit in federal
court against New Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds, seeking a
declaration that a New Mexico statute which prohibits exportation
of groundwater is unconstitutional. As grounds for its complaint, El
Paso stated that the embargo law imposes an undue burden on interstate commerce, denies Texas citizens the privileges and immunities
of New Mexico citizens, and deprives El Paso of 'equal protection of
the laws.I
The issue is of more than regional interest, as at least 14 states and
the District of Columbia have statutes directly prohibiting or regulating the export of state water;2 other statutes indirectly regulate such
export by narrow definitions of beneficial use3 or by legislation de4
signed to protect the needs of the area in which the water originates.
Additionally, increased demands for water, and conflicting water law
principles of neighboring states, lend an element of tension to the
confrontation. El Paso v. Reynolds may well be the first stage in the
clarification of an issue which has been obscured by the presence of
contradictory case law over the years and, further, may be a landmark
decision in the field of natural resources law as water supplies continue to dwindle, demands continue to increase, and states become
even more concerned with protecting their citizens and conserving
their local resources.
HISTORY OF ANTI-EXPORTATION STATUTES
The commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[tihe
Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes." s
1. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 730 M (D.N.M., filed Sept. 5, 1980).
2. White, Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate Transfer of Percolating Water, 2
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 383, 385 n.ll (1969).
3. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-104 (1979): "(A] use of water for slurry to
export coal from Montana is not a beneficial use."
4. White, supra note 2, at 385.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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Because the federal government has thus pre-empted the field of
interstate commerce, state legislation or activity which interferes
with or burdens the flow of interstate commerce is forbidden.6
State embargos have, over the years, been challenged as undue burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce. In 1896, the United
States Supreme Court, in Geer v. Connecticut, held that a Connecticut non-exportation statute was a valid exercise of state power and
did not violate the commerce clause. 7 The statute in question prohibited the transport of game birds killed in Connecticut to points
beyond.' The Court discussed ancient laws, which acknowledged that
a person's right to possess wild animals was an ownership qualified by
governmental authority. Such authority is to be exercised for the
benefit of the society as a whole, and the state, in this sense, is a
trustee for its citizens.9 The Court concluded that a state's attempt
to keep its property within its jurisdiction is not a burden on interstate commerce.' 0 Because the state has a duty to preserve a valuable
food supply for its citizens, the Court held the law effecting such a
result to be constitutional, even if "in doing so commerce might be
remotely affected."' '
Geer remained good law for more than 80 years and served as
foundation for Hudson County Water Co. v, McCarter,I2 which in
turn is the chief support for anti-exportation proponents in modern
times. In Hudson, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held constitutional
a New Jersey statute prohibiting the transportation of New Jersey
river water out of state; specifically, the state embargo did not impair
contracts, deny privileges or immunities, offend due process notions,
or interfere with interstate commerce. Referring to Geer and a state's
right to exercise its police power, Holmes said:
...few public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to
maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public
welfare may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.' '
Holmes gave short shrift to the commerce clause argument, stating
6. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
7. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2546 (1888).
9. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
10. Id. at 530.
11. Id. at 535.

12. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
13. Id. at 356.
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that "[a] man cannot acquire a right to property by his desire to use
it in interstate commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge
his otherwise limited and qualified right to the same end."'1 '
Because a person's right in wild animals and water was conditioned
on a state's ability and duty to protect such resources for all citizens,
a state embargo to that end was considered legitimate. A few years
later, Hudson was distinguished in Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co.,'1 largely on the basis of the difference in treatment of water
and gas.' 6 In Oklahoma, the Court held that natural gas and oil,
when reduced to possession by the owner of the land, are subjects of
interstate commerce, despite statutory assertions of the state's right
and intent to conserve its resources. Private property interests in the
gas and oil were at issue here, as opposed to state fiduciary interests
in water, protected by Geer.
The two cases coexisted for many years, and state embargos on exportation of water withstood constitutional challenges until 1966.
That year the Oklahoma city of Altus sued in federal court for a declaratory judgment that a Texas statute prohibiting removal of water
from private Texas wells was unconstitutional. The district court in
Altus v. Carr' ' held that such a statute did in fact violate the commerce clause because it placed an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed per
curiam, without over-ruling Hudson, and without indicating grounds
for affirmance.
Because of the coexistence of seemingly disparate federal and state
court opinions on anti-exportation statutes and state powers, and because the distinct nature of individual resources often leads to differing results, an analysis of the rationale behind the precedent governing non-exportation statutes is necessary to anticipate and evaluate
the upcoming results in El Paso v. Reynolds and other embargo cases.
ANALYSIS OF ANTI-EXPORTATION STATUTES
The conflict between Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter and
Altus v. Carr derives primarily from differences in conceptualization
of property rights, state powers, and public policy. Problems in reconciling the two cases are enormous, and many have attempted to
analyze their relative weights from both procedural and substantive
14. Id. at 357.
15. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
16. Id at 258-60. "And surely we need not pause to point out the difference between
such a river, flowing upon the surface of the earth, and such a substance as gas, seeping invisible through sands beneath the surface." Id. at 260.
17. Altusv. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.),aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
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points of view.1" Though many commentators feel that Altus left
Hudson with very little bite and suggest that all anti-exportation statutes are invalid,1 the conclusion is not unanimous. 2"
The problem with Altus is that the Supreme Court did not write
or publish an opinion, leaving us with merely a per curiam order
affirming a district court opinion. This is especially disconcerting because the district court relied heavily upon two natural gas cases, 2 1
both of which were accompanied by dissents and both of which involved out-of-state reliance upon a continued gas supply. 2 2 Thus the
precedent, incorporated by reference, was based on different issues
as well as assumptions as to the legal and physical similarities between
natural gas and water.
Hudson, too, has its weaknesses, as it relies heavily upon Geer;
Geer has recently been expressly overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma,
which rejected the state-ownership-of-wild-animals theory. 2 1 Also,
though the district court and Supreme Court both considered Hudson
before deciding Altus, both chose to base their final decision on the
more recent and contradictory gas law cases. And yet, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would abandon an aged precedent to
adopt, without any explanation, an entirely new concept of state
power.2 It is very difficult to evaluate an opinion which not only
lacks explanation but also fails to indicate an awareness of the magnitude of the issue. 2 s
18. As recently as 1979, a federal district court cited Geer for the proposition that a
state has authority to regulate its fish and game, in the absence of federal pre-emption.
United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 266 (W.D. Mich. 1979). But in April of 1979,
the Supreme Court overruled Geer, holding that a state statute which forbade exportation
of natural minnows taken within the state was unconstitutional. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 332 (1979).
A subsequent eighth circuit decision held that a state's refusal to sell cement to out-ofstate customers during a cement shortage did not violate the commerce clause. Reeves, Inc.
v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980). Also pending
for review is a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision holding that a state can legitimately
pass regulations controlling water pollution. National Wood Preservers v. Pennsylvania, Pa.,
414 A.2d 37, appeal dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 47 (1980). The latter case is interesting in that it
cites Hudson as support for its holding. Dictum in the case states that police power is necessary and, even if harsh, cannot be limited as long as it is not arbitrary but is reasonable. Id.
at 43.
19. White, supra note 2, at 389 nn.46-49.

20. See, e.g., Corker, Can a State Embargo the Export of Water by Transbasin Diversion? 12 IDAHO L. REV. 135 (1976); White, supra note 2; Comment, It's Our Water!-Can

Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 119.
21. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,

221 U.S. 229 (1911).
22.
23.
24.
25.

Corker, supra note 20, at 147 n.46.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See also note 18, supra.
Comment, supra note 20, at 135.
White, supra note 2, at 389 n.50.
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The Court's affirmance in Altus does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the commerce clause argument, merely an acquiescence
in the result. Possibly the affirmance is narrowly limited to a specific
fact situation in which there is out-of-state reliance on a continued
supply, absolute ownership theories of water law, and a failure to
show conservation purposes inherent in the offending statute. 2 6 Attempts to determine the current law on the subject by analyzing
what the Court did not say, and the fact that it did not say it, are
minimally useful second-guessing of the Supreme Court. Substantive
analysis of the two conflicting opinions is only slightly more useful.
While Hudson implies that water is not an article of commerce
until it begins to move in interstate traffic, 2 7 Altus clearly considers
water to be an article of commerce. 2 8 Apart from Altus itself, there
is no precedent for treating water as an article of commerce; 2 9 the
Supreme Court has indicated in the past its tendency to treat water
as a unique commodity, unlike gas or other natural resources.3 0 This
is important because other natural resources have been held to be
articles of commerce, 3 especially once they have been transformed
into a condition suitable for transporting; statutes that interfere with
interstate transport of these articles are unconstitutionally burden3
some. 2
Despite the apparent conflicts in the holdings of Altus and Hudson,
both remain good law. Several tests and analyses have developed recently in an attempt to reconcile the conflict. Because many states
have anti-exportation statutes and may want to prevent certain resources from leaving the state, awareness of the arguments on each
side is important for them.
THE HUGHES TEST
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma overruled
Geer, the Connecticut game bird case, and adopted a general test for
33
determining whether state law burdens interstate commerce.
[W] e must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or
discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in
26. See 255 F. Supp. at 839-40.
27. 209 U.S. at 357-58.
28. 255 F. Supp. at 840.
29. Comment, supra note 20, at 128.
30. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). See also
Comment, supra note 20, at 134-35.
31. Comment, supra note 20, at 129 nrL 60 & 61.
32. Id. at 129-30.
33. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means could promote this
local purpose
as well without discriminating against interstate com34
merce.
The Court noted that the initial burden is upon the party claiming
discrimination, but once discrimination against commerce is shown,
the burden is upon the state to justify the statute in terms of local
benefit and lack of nondiscriminatory alternatives.3" Further, the
Court is not constrained by the characterization given to the law by
the legislature, but
instead "will determine for itself the practical im3
pact of the law." 6
Thus, though state interest in conservation and protection of its
resources was viewed as a legitimate local purpose, the Court said
that a state may not use the fiction of state ownership, as it did in
Geer, to place the burden on non-residents when there are equally
suitable conservation alternatives. 3 7
In Hughes, the statute under review was an Oklahoma law which
forbade the transport of natural minnows to points outside of Oklahoma. Because such an embargo was one of the more discriminatory
alternatives available to Oklahoma, and because the Court, in overruling Geer, decided that wild animals can become articles of commerce, the state statute was held to violate the commerce clause. The
Chief Justice joined Justice Rehnquist in a dissent that recognized
Oklahoma's interest in conservation 38 and noted in passing that,
given the primacy of local interest, he would require the challenger
of state conservation laws to establish a much greater burden on
interstate commerce than was shown in the case at bar. 3 9
Analyzing the strength of any anti-exportation legislation in terms
of the Hughes test can be done only after gaining a familiarity with
the arguments surrounding the commerce clause, state powers, and
property rights. Because of the tension between the state and federal
sovereigns, caused by the desire of each to regulate and control for
the benefit of its own citizens, future litigation in this area will involve close judicial scrutiny of the purposes and effects of embargo
statutes.
34. Id. at 336.
35. Id., citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353

(1977).
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

336.
337.
346 (dissent).
343 n.7.
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STATE POWERS
Though clearly the states have exercised regulatory control over
the natural resources within their boundaries, it is unclear where the
source of such power lies. States generally claim three sovereign
powers: (1) the police or regulatory power necessary to protect public health and safety; (2) compact powers enabling states to enter
into mutual agreements concerning resources which take precedence
over previously vested private rights; and (3) the right of parens
patriae which obligates the state to represent its citizens and their
common interests. 4 0 These sovereign powers include all powers not
specifically reserved to the federal government or the people by the
federal and state constitutions.4 1 The specific reservations of power
serve as limitations on state control.
The commerce clause limitation is one such reservation, though it
is flexible: courts tend to balance the national interest in facilitating
interstate commerce against the local interest in conservation and
regulation.4 2 Only where the burden on interstate commerce is direct
and substantial,
and the local interest slight, will the national interest
4
prevail. 3
National policy as well may limit sovereign powers, but even policy
restrictions against discrimination are flexible, and deference to state
sovereignty tends to support any reasonable classification set forth in
the statute. 4 This allows for disparities in treatment if those discriminated against are a source of evil which the statute seeks to regulate4 1 and if such discrimination is adequately justified.4 6
Whether or not there are discriminatory elements to state statutes
prohibiting export of water, public policy arguments support such an
exercise of state power. When water is retained for use within the
state, the state derives an economic benefit through increased production and property value; further, income and state revenues are
increased. These benefits are an integral part of the concept of "beneficial use" which is at the heart of water law in prior appropriation
states such as New Mexico."'7 Following this reasoning, it is proposed
40. Parensparriae, the parent of the country, is the doctrine which recognizes the duty
of the state to protect its citizens. See Martz, Grazis, Interstate Transfer of Water and Water
Rights-The Slurry Issue, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33, 50 (1977).
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id. at 54-55.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Comment, supra note 20, at 130.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 126.
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that "[t] here is no justifiable reason which should require that sister
state to sacrifice its future growth for the immediate growth of the
requesting state."'4 8 The opposing argument is, of course, that which
insists "our economic unit is the Nation" 4 and rejects economic
protectionism.
Still, because of the unique nature of water, as recognized in water
compacts and judicial decisions,5 states have been allowed, generally, to regulate the use and taking of waters within their boundaries.
Extension of this policy arguably may include the enforcement of
non-exportation statutes which have at their source the recognition
"that water is the one building block which is essential to the economic growth of any state, municipality, industry or agricultural endeavor."' ' 1 Such a theory presumes that the states must be allowed
to determine how best to regulate the waters within their own
boundaries, free from federal interference. Apart from the jurisdictional conflict as to whose laws regulate and preempt, many other
water law issues affect an analysis of non-exportation statutes. Such
issues as the legal limitations on removal of water from appurtenant
lands or basins of origin, burdens of showing lack of injury to other
water users, and prohibitions against enlarging uses' 2 are settled by
state law and are inextricably intertwined with policy considerations
underlying embargo laws.
Public policy arguments in favor of state regulation of water are
especially persuasive in states which claim their waters for the beneficial use of their citizens.5 I In states where water rights may be individual property rights, the state has a more difficult time justifying
its desire to regulate commerce in water; but in a state which "owns"
its water for public use, and merely permits individual citizens the
right to use the water according to strict statutory guidelines, there is
a strong argument in favor of allowing the state to exercise its control over the water. This distinction in proprietary concepts of water
law is important and is the consideration upon which the final results
of the non-exportation issue may pivot.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property rights vary significantly from state to state and are determined by several major doctrines.' I The effect of the doctrines upon
48. Id.at 121.
49. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949).
50. Comment, supra note 20, at 127.
51. Id.

52. Martz, supra note 40, at 35 n.6.
53. Comment, supra note 20, at 127-28.
54. See White, supra note 2, at 386-87.
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non-exportation statutes is crucial. For example, in Texas, groundwater rights are governed by the absolute privilege doctrine which
allows an individual to capture, own, possess, and dispose of his
water as he sees fit." Thus, the Altus decision that water is an article
of commerce was premised upon a recognition of Texas common law
allowing for the extraction and sale of percolating waters.
On the other hand, New Jersey, a riparian state, had its non-exportation statute upheld; the Court in Hudson assumed that water may
5
not be diverted from a stream for more than a reasonable distance. 6
As a result, water could not be considered an article of commerce.
Although at least five property doctrines may affect water law in
any given state, 17 western states follow the prior appropriation doctrine; not coincidentally, such states frequently have arid climates
and scarce water supplies. They are the very states that one would
expect to enact embargo legislation to protect their undependable resource. For this reason, further discussion of non-exportation laws
will concentrate on the effect of such laws in prior appropriation
states.
Although the water codes of prior appropriation states vary, common elements to each are: (1) the waters are declared to be public,
state-owned property; appropriators gain only the right to use the
waters, (2) underground waters are available for appropriation to
beneficial use, and (3) permits are required in order to appropriate
groundwater.'
In many cases, the dedication of waters to public use or the claim
of such waters as property of the state is found in the state constitution.' 8 Such constitutions also limit the use of water to beneficial
uses. Though certain of the constitutions limit the use to the citizens
of the state, 5 9 none specifically prohibit the export of water to a
neighboring state.
Under prior appropriation doctrines, the water user does not own
the water itself, merely the usufructary right. 6 1 In permit states, such
as New Mexico, such a use is limited by the permit and by procedures
which are legislated and must be obeyed prior to the perfection of
the water right. 6 ' As the true owner, then, the state can be said to
have the right to regulate its water use, within reason.62 Furthermore,
55. Id. at 387-88.
56. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 354 (1908). See also Martz, supra
note 40, at 43.
57. White, supra note 2, at 402.
58. Martz, supra note 40, at 37, 47.
59. Id. at 38.
60. White, supra note 2, at 402.
61. Id. at 403; Comment, supra note 20, at 124.
62. White, supra note 2, at 405; Comment, supra note 20, at 123.
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because the waters have been reserved to the benefit of the state's
citizens, the state has an obligation to ensure public welfare and to
preserve valuable state resources.6 3 Thus it would appear to be a
legitimate exercise of state power to disallow exportation of water
resources which can be more beneficially and advantageously used
within the state.
The problem with this argument is that "the particular property
theory which a state has adopted with respect to its water should not
make any significant difference in determining whether or not a stat'
ute unreasonably burdens or interferes with interstate commerce. "64
After all, the state ownership theory is really nothing more than a
legal fiction intended to support state regulatory powers, and interstate commerce is not something which should be allowed or restrained on the basis of an individual state's conceptualization of its
powers. 6
On the other hand, the states' differing theories and laws governing property and water rights have been developed over the years to
meet very real and individualized circumstances. A state's interest in
maintaining its workable systems is a genuine and legitimate interest
to be balanced against federal commerce concerns. Although at first
glance it may appear that other states are penalized by their choice
of property theory, in fact the choices were all in response to state
needs and resources; the states that do not have the strong need to
declare state ownership of water cannot, of course, claim that their
state interest in preventing interstate commerce in private property
is legitimate.
COMMERCE CLAUSE
The need to resolve such conflicts by a certain amount of balancing
has arisen as a response to the commerce clause which protects interstate commerce from state interference. The purpose of the clause is
to prevent national commerce from being burdened by hostile or
parochial state laws. 6 6 Even if the federal government had not preempted the field, states may not intrude into areas in which uniform
regulation is desirable.6 7
The Supreme Court has consistently held that non-exportation
68
statutes are hostile laws which interfere with interstate commerce,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Comment, supra note 20, at 124-25.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Martz, supra note 40, at 60 n.76.
White, supra note 2, at 385 n.13; Comment, supra note 20, at 131.
Martz, supra note 40, at 60.
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but there is to date no precedent for extending the commerce clause
to water rights. 6 I If an activity is a local concern, if the item is not
an article of commerce, and if the activity regulated does not bear a
close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce, it is unlikely that there is a violation of the commerce clause. 7 0
Non-discriminatory local regulation, if based on a valid local concern, will generally be upheld.7 1 Thus, while state legislation concerning water rights may ultimately affect interstate commerce, it may be
outside the scope of the commerce clause.72
For example, both Congress and the Constitution recognize the sovereignty of the state in local regulation for the protection of natural
resources. Where states are subject to interstate water compacts, the
Congress has recognized the rights of the states to regulate and control those waters within their jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has
also recognized the rights of the states to regulate their water resources. In short, there may be said to exist a right of the state to
prohibit the exportation of those waters found wholly within its
boundaries-a right which the federal government should recognize
as a legitimate regulation of a matter of local concern. 7 3
Even though such a statute may affect interstate commerce, it is
arguably a valid exercise of state police power if the local benefit to
be gained outweighs the minor inconvenience to interstate commerce.7 I Even if the burden is heavy, it is not so unreasonable as to
be impermissible, in light of water's unique status.7 '
Some non-exportation statutes prohibit any exportation of
water.7 6 Others allow it if the recipient state has legislated reciprocal
rights. 7 7 Statutes requiring such reciprocal rights are probably not
antithetic to national policies governing commerce7 8 when a state can
exhibit local interest and Congress has not pre-empted the field. 7 9
On the other hand, statutes which absolutely forbid exportationand statutes which require special legislative approval prior to exportation 8 0 -are more likely to burden interstate commerce and thus be
69. Id. at 61.
70. Id. at 61-62; Comment, supra note 20, at 131-32. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
71. Martz, supra note 40, at 61-62.
72. Id.
73. Comment, supra note 20, at 125.
74. Id. at 126, 142.
75. Id. at 143.
76. Martz, supra note 40, at 62 n.87.
77. Id. at 63 n.88.
78. Comment, supra note 20, at 142.
79. Id. at 142-43.
80. Id. at 142-45.
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invalidated. Clearly, the stated conservation purposes of such statutes
may be accomplished by alternative, less discriminatory means.' The
probability is that:
if a court is permitted to strike a balance, as it is, between federal interests in interstate commerce and local interests in water conservation, development and use, the character of the local interest is such
as to justify some or all of the forms of regulation described without
considering 2them to be discriminatory interferences with interstate
commerce. 8
Another approach to the commerce clause issue is to ask if the
statutory purpose seeks to regulate an activity which bears a "close
and substantial relation" to interstate commerce. If so, the statute infringes upon the federal power to regulate, even if the activity were a
local concern and the statute purported to conserve a state's natural
resources for its citizens; the statute bears a relation to commerce by
halting it at the state line.8 s If, for example, the statute does not
prevent exportation under certain circumstances or by specified
means, the statute is less8 likely to have a direct and substantial effect
on interstate commerce. 4
CONCLUSION
Although at first the Altus opinion implies that state non-exportation statutes cannot survive the commerce clause challenge, a number
of distinctions support a contrary conclusion at least in the area of
water legislation. Upon reviewing such distinctions, one legal commentator concluded:
Clearly, I think, the Commerce Clause does not threaten the validity
of any state legislation limiting or forbidding export of water if that
legislation applies to future diversions and is wholly without discrimination in favor of exports for use within [the state.] Interstate
"commerce" may or may not be involved, but if it is, nondiscriminatory legislation is likely to survive
if it has a clear and demonstrable
85
relation to any state purposeIn New Mexico, a prior appropriation state, any water rights which
vested prior to the passage of the non-exportation statute (1953)
could not be retroactively changed or controlled, absent state proof
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Martz, supra note 40, at 63.
Comment, supra note 20, at 131-32.
Id. at 125.
Corker, supra note 20, at 148.
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that such control is necessary for the public good.8 6 And since most
of New Mexico's water is already appropriated, lack of retroactive
8
capability may indicate the lack of effectiveness of the statute. 7
However, prospective non-exportation statutes may be valid if they
meet the following criteria: (1) the sovereign power encompasses
state waters, (2) there is strong local interest in restricting exports,
(3) the legislation is non-discriminatory, and (4) Congress has not
pre-empted the field.8 8
In an effort to indicate a state concern with conservation, rather
than thinly-disguised discrimination, a statute should avoid flat prohibitions against transportation out of state. If a statute indicates an
attempt to regulate water transfers by prohibiting the transfer outside the basin, watershed, or aquifer, as well as out-of-state, it more
strongly indicates its conservationist purpose. Also, if an embargo on
exportation of groundwater is necessary to prevent the impairment
of a natural resource (e.g., an aquifer of percolating water), this
might be a valid prohibition. 8 9
The New Mexico statute presently being challenged in El Paso v.
Reynolds does not prohibit the exportation of all water, merely
groundwater, and even that prohibition is not absolute, as it allows
for the exportation of groundwater for designated uses. 9 0 Also, the
water basin from which El Paso desires to take water has been declared a protected basin by New Mexico's State Engineer, Steve
Reynolds; if he can show that the basin involved is in danger of being
impaired by exportation to Texas, additional arguments favor prohibiting such transfer.
The importance of a state's interest in regulating and controlling
its water is a significant factor.9 In New Mexico, the extensive water
code has been developed as a means of regulating and conserving the
resource which is most vital and rare to the state. The statute itself
declares all waters, including underground waters, to be public
waters, subject to appropriation for beneficial use. 9 2 Because the
need for water is crucial in New Mexico, and because the water laws
prevent any diversion-in state or out-that impairs water rights, New
Mexico can reasonably assert its interest in preventing exportations
of water to neighboring states.
86. Martz, supra note 40, at 56.
87. Id. at 58.
88. Id. at 57. Note that Martz believes these criteria cannot be met by the New Mexico
statute.
89. White, supra note 2, at 405-06.
90. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (Supp. 1980).
91. Comment, supra note 20, at 136-37.
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1, -12-1 (1978).
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Of course, if a statute is discriminatory, it may place too great a
burden on interstate commerce. This determination must be made
after weighing federal and state interests against each other, and, if
water is acknowledged as a unique resource, unlike natural gas, states
can argue that they should be able to place necessary restrictions on
the use and appropriation of water before the burden on interstate
commerce is declared to be unconstitutional. 9 1
Given New Mexico's state-ownership theory of water as well as its
strong interest in exercising its state police and regulatory powers, it
should be clear that New Mexico has a sincere and long-standing need
to control the disposition of water within its arid boundaries. The
bulk alone of the laws and cases in New Mexico that have attempted
to protect rights and the efficient use of water would indicate that
New Mexico's embargo on water transfer is not discriminatory, in
form or in effect, as the citizens of New Mexico, as well as Texas, are
constrained by the requirements of the state water code.
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